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Abstract
Willingness to pay for an environmental improvement is a function of how long it takes
to deliver the improvement. To measure the e¤ect of time on benets, I utilize a discrete
choice experiment that includes an attribute for delay until the improvement occurs and
simultaneously estimate discount rates and valuation parameters. I estimate the present
value of immediate and delayed Minnesota River Basin improvements using discount rates
directly estimated from the econometric model. Compared to an immediate river basin
cleanup, Minnesota residents lose almost half of the benets when cleanup is delayed by ve
years.
JEL Codes: D90, Q25, Q51, H43
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1 Introduction
In recent years, discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have gained popularity for the valuation
of environmental improvements. However, most of these studies fail to take into account a
fundamental characteristic of the improvement; that is the timing of the benets and costs of
the improvement. This is not a trivial matter since delays as short as several years can make
big di¤erences in individualsWTP. In light of this, I explicitly incorporate time until the
improvement occurs as an attribute of the choice alternative. I can then calculate how much
benet is lost when restoration projects are delayed under various discounting assumptions
including exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic specications.
According to the EPAs 2002 National Water Quality Inventory (2008), over 48 percent of
the United Statesassessed mileage of rivers and streams is classied as impaired or threat-
ened. Agriculture is listed as the leading source of impairment, followed by other unknown
nonpoint sources. Because of the nature of nonpoint pollution sources, it necessarily takes
time to improve the environmental quality of a watershed. For example, there is a lag
between when a pollutant is applied to a eld and when the pollutant reaches the surface
water body. Or, riparian bu¤er zones may have potential to remove up to 100 percent of
incoming nitrate (Fennessy and Cronk, 1997), but it takes time to restore such a functioning
zone where they are currently absent. Thus, it could be misleading to model the execution of
a river cleanup as occurring today. Specically, the present value of river restoration could
be overestimated if the time dimension of the cleanup is ignored.
A stated preference survey concerning cleanup options for the Minnesota River Basin
(MRB) was administered to Minnesota residents to gain insight into Minnesota residents
time preferences for environmental improvements. Based on this data, I simultaneously esti-
mate discount rates and valuation parameters using the random utility theoretic framework
developed in Meyer (2012).1 Here, I build on Meyer (2012) by examining welfare implications
and estimating specications that model heterogeneity in utility based on observable respon-
dent characteristics. Since small changes in discount rates can often lead to large changes
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in present values, it is preferable to estimate discount rates within the context of the appli-
cation at hand when conducting welfare analysis. This is an improvement over studies that
rst estimate valuation parameters and then later use researcher-imposed discount rates to
calculate the present value of benets.
I nd that individuals discount their valuation of a cleanup of the MRB at a mean annual
rate of thirteen percent. That is, individuals are willing to pay thirteen percent less for the
same environmental improvement when the improvement is delayed by one year. I nd evi-
dence of signicant heterogeneity in exponential discount factors and nd some evidence that
this heterogeneity can be explained by several observable individual characteristics. Resi-
dents of the MRB are less patient than nonresidents in the context of MRB improvements.
There is weaker evidence that males are more patient than females and that discount rates
decrease with education level. I also nd evidence of signicant heterogeneity in individuals
marginal valuations of basin improvement both from a random coe¢ cients specication and
from specications that interact basin improvements with personal characteristics. Individ-
uals with higher incomes and younger individuals display a higher marginal WTP for basin
improvements. Additionally, in light of the recent research by Daly et al. (2012), I employ a
bounded triangular distribution for the cost parameter to ensure that the WTP distribution
exists.
A ve year delay in basin cleanup leads to a 45 percent loss in marginal benets com-
pared to an immediate cleanup for identical levels of water quality improvement under the
assumption of exponential discounting. While the survey sample is not representative of the
Minnesota population, the summary characteristics of the sample are quite similar to the
overall Minnesota population in many categories and there is substantial variation in the
demographics of the survey participants. Thus, policy makers can gain some insight into
how public support may change for alternative public policies with di¤ering time dimensions.
Economists have noted the dilemma that exponential discounting poses for cost benet
analysis of distant future events.2 Essentially, events far in the future do not matter much
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when exponential discounting is utilized. However, an analysis of various discounting speci-
cations in this context of river basin improvement over a short-term time horizon leads to
very similar conclusions across the models.
2 Previous Literature
Stated preference approaches have previously been used to estimated the value of use and
non-use benets from ecosystem services. A 1999 survey article by Wilson and Carpenter
(1999) summarizes the work in river and lake ecosystem valuation that was completed prior
to 1997. Flores and Shafran (2007) update Wilson and Carpenters work by summarizing
studies completed since 1997. In this section, I focus on DCEs since they are most directly
related to this research.
DCEs have been used to value water quality in several published studies. Whitmore and
Cavadias (1974) estimate preferences for improving water quality in a Canadian community.
Smith and Desvousges (1986) value water quality improvements of the Monongahela River
in Pennsylvania. Magat et al. (2000) value increases in water quality for hypothetical rivers
and lakes using an iterative approach and dont nd any evidence of diminishing returns to
improved water quality. That is, it appears that there is little harm in modeling preferences
with a constant marginal utility of water quality improvement. Benets are estimated
in Magat el al. (2000) on an annual basis but temporal considerations are not addressed.
Farber and Griner (2000) survey residents of a degraded watershed in Western Pennsylvania
and utilize a DCE to value improvements in the watershed. The questions are worded so
that WTP is interpreted as a per year measure with a duration of ve years. However, no
discounting is used in the analysis to convert the sum of ve annual payments into a present
value. Collins et al. (2005) estimate the economic values of improving aquatic life, scenic
quality, and swimming in a West Virginia creek using a DCE. They estimate benets per
month but do not attempt to aggregate benets across time.
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While there is a wide range in the methods utilized in previous studies, a common
characteristic is that the time dimension of ecosystem improvements is largely ignored. One
notable exception is the experimental design utilized by Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008).
They estimate WTP for a water quality improvement as a function of the time until the
improvement occurs.
Although the time dimension of ecosystem improvements is often ignored, there is a line
of literature that has utilized stated preference methods to estimate discount rates in the
context of mortality risk reductions and the VSL. Alberini et al. (2006) utilize a survey with a
dichotomous choice response format to nd an estimated discount rate of around 5.5 percent
for Americans and 8.6 percent for Canadians. They do not nd any signicant relationship
between personal characteristics and the discount rate except for nationality. Alberini and
Chiabai (2007) use a dichotomous choice response format to estimate a discount rate of 0.3-
1.7 percent in a similar VSL context in Italy. They also nd a discount rate of 8.7 percent
for money versus money tradeo¤s.
Rheinberger (2011) estimates the VSL in the context of risk reductions on Alpine Roads
using a DCE and nd a discount rate around 11 percent. Rheinberger assumes that dis-
counting is exponential and does not investigate heterogeneity in discounting behavior as
the study is more concerned with risk parameters. Alberini and casný (2011) use a DCE
on risk reduction proles where the respondent answers for themselves or for their child.
They include an attribute, "latency," that takes on values of 0, 2, 5, or 10 years, which
represents the delay until the risk reduction occurs. The discount rate is estimated close to
zero with an insignicant t-test. They also assume that there is one discount rate for the
model. Alberini et al. (2007) utilize a DCE in the context of the VSL where they include
two dependent attributes: the delay until the risk reduction occurs and the duration of the
risk reduction benets (year). Heterogeneity in the discount rate is captured by modeling
the discount rate as a function of observable personal characteristics. They nd an average
discount rate for future risk reductions of 7 to 9 percent depending on the specication. All
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of these aforementioned VSL studies assume exponential discounting.
Two recent papers utilize empirical models that are based on the contingent valuation
method to estimate rates of time preference and WTP. Kovacs and Larson (2008) estimate
household discount rates in the range of thirty percent from a valuation study of public open
space in Portland, Oregon. They use a double-bounded, dichotomous choice WTP question
where they include variation in the schedule of payment across respondents. Similarly, Bond,
Cullen, and Larson (2009) nd discount rates ranging from 23.1 percent to 79.55 percent by
varying the payment schedule and benets timing in a valuation study of endangered species
protection. While these two studies do explicitly consider the time dimension of public goods
valuation, they do not consider any discounting models other than the standard exponential
model.
3 Study Design
3.1 Description of the Minnesota River Basin Study Area3 and
Regulatory Environment
The Minnesota River is Minnesotas largest tributary to the Mississippi River. It ows from
Big Stone Lake on the Minnesota / South Dakota border until it doubles the volume of
the Mississippi at their conuence near St. Paul, Minnesota (see Figure 1). Approximately
16,770 square miles in area, the MRB surrounds the Minnesota River. Agriculture predom-
inates as the main land use, comprising 92 percent of the basins area. According to the
Minnesota River Basin Information Page from the University of Minnesota, "agricultural
activities in the basin produce about 41% of Minnesotas corn, 51% of its soybeans, 11% of
its wheat, 41% of its hogs, 22% of its beef, and adds several billion dollars to state revenues"
(2008). Thus, the basin is an especially productive agricultural area.
As is common for highly agricultural areas, there are elevated levels of nonpoint source
pollutants in the MRB. According to the Minnesota River Data Center (2007) at Minnesota
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State University, Mankato, the Minnesota River is one of the most seriously polluted rivers in
the state of the Minnesota and the United States. Excessive sediment and nutrients such as
phosphorus and nitrogen adversely a¤ect sh populations and aquatic plants by stimulating
high levels of algal growth and reducing the amount of oxygen in the water. Also, extremely
high levels of algal growth sometimes turn into algal blooms which release toxins in the
water that kill aquatic organisms. Furthermore, high levels of nitrate, fecal coliform and
mercury discourage recreational uses of the MRB and pose potential health risks for human
populations. Nitrate can pollute ground water and if ingested can cause methomogobinemia
(also referred to as blue baby syndrome). Over 90 percent of the streams monitored in the
MRB have fecal coliform levels that are unsafe and mercury in the MRB is ingested by
sh, sometimes making it unsafe to eat sh caught in the MRB. In a scientic study of the
Lower Minnesota River, Balogh, Meyer, and Johnson (1997) nd that the mercury loadings
are mainly determined by runo¤-driven sediment inputs and minimally inuenced by point
source inputs. Sediment runo¤ is higher in intensively cultivated areas such as the MRB
than in more undisturbed ecosystems.
In addition to these localized environmental problems, the MRB water quality problems
transfer to other downstream areas. Lake Pepin, downstream of the conuence of the
Minnesota and Mississippi Rivers, is lling in with sediment at ten times the natural rate
and over ninety percent of the sediment is attributable to the Minnesota River. Excess
nitrates ow from the Minnesota River to the Mississippi River and nally to the Gulf
of Mexico where depleted oxygen levels damage commercial shell shing and the aquatic
ecosystem in general.
All surface waters in Minnesota are legally protected for aquatic life and recreation. Reg-
ulations state that water quality should be able to maintain healthy, diverse and successfully
reproducing populations of aquatic organisms, including invertebrates such as sh and should
be suitable for swimming and other forms of water recreation. The Federal Clean Water Act
requires the State of Minnesota to assess whether surface waters support their designated
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uses.
While it is true that states can designate other uses of surface waters, Minnesotas sur-
face water quality rules dictate that, unless listed otherwise, all waterbodies are protected for
aquatic life and recreation but not drinking water. As the rule is written, this also protects
the waterbody for industrial use, agricultural uses, aesthetics and navigation, and "other
uses." The vast majority of waterbodies in Minnesota fall into this category although there
are 31 stream segments or lakes within the MRB that are protected as a source of drinking
water as well as for aquatic life and recreation. 4 Less than one percent of all waterbodies
in Minnesota are classied as "limited resource value waters", which receive treated waste-
water and have limited protection (MPCA). In the MRB, there are 16 stream segments, 8
marshes/sloughs/swamps, and many ditches currently listed as limited resource value wa-
ters. Thus, even if respondents are aware of these segments that would never be cleaned to
the swimmable and shable criteria, there is a small enough number of such segments that
it should not detract from the plausibility of cleaning between fty and seventy percent of
the basin. 5
Preliminary data from the MPCA suggest that only ten percent of reviewed lake acres and
nine percent of reviewed stream miles in the MRB support all assessed uses, suggesting that
approximately 90 percent of the basin is likely impaired.6 Once a stream section or lake is
listed as impaired, the MPCA develops limits (Total Maximum Daily Loads or "TMDLs")
on problem pollutants within the area. The MPCA establishes TMDLs such that the
surface waters will support aquatic life and recreation and then develops plans for meeting
the pollution limits. From the 2008 MPCA Impaired Waters Inventory, the MPCA listed
336 impaired stream sections or lakes in the MRB that still required a TMDL. There were
an additional 85 impaired stream sections or lakes that had been listed as impaired but a
TMDL study had been approved by the EPA. Finally, there were 87 stream sections or lakes
that were impaired by multiple pollutants with at least one TMDL study plan approved by
the EPA. In the 2006 MPCA Impaired Waters Inventory, there were 497 stream sections
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or lakes that still required a TMDL and zero stream sections or lakes with EPA-approved
TMDLs. Thus, there was substantial progress in the assessment and planning stages leading
up to the timing of the survey.
3.2 Study Sample
The MRB provides both use and nonuse values to residents of Minnesota and downstream
Mississippi River states. For feasibility, this study concentrates on use and nonuse values
for Minnesota residents only.7 In January of 2008, I administered a stated preference survey
concerning water quality improvements in the MRB using a survey research rm, Survey
Sampling International (SSI). Individuals receive incentives for participating in SSI surveys.
Approximately 250 Minnesota residents voluntarily accessed the survey via the internet and
the survey was available to all Minnesota SSI panel members until the quota of 250 responses
was met. 8 Some individuals that accessed the survey didnt answer required questions and
were subsequently dropped from the sample. I dropped all observations from individuals
that omitted responses to any of the demographic questions. I also dropped all observations
from individuals that omitted responses to more than ve choice scenarios.9 After dropping
these individuals, I was left with 237 usable surveys.
3.3 Survey Instrument and Data
The rst portion of the survey provides background information about the location and
sub-basins of the study area. This portion of the survey also asks about respondentsprior
knowledge and use of the basin, as well as whether the respondent lives in one of the sub-
basins. To further establish context, the survey details the current environmental situation
of the MRB. It also explains that all surface waters in Minnesota are legally protected by
the Federal Clean Water Act and that Minnesota is required to assess whether water quality
is su¢ cient for all water bodies in the basin. Additionally, the survey informs respondents
that the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency is currently developing limits on pollutants in
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order to comply with the Clean Water Act. Including this information should help establish
more credibility to the survey exercise and emphasize to respondents that their opinions may
actually shape public policy.
After respondents are familiarized with the study area, they complete the DCE. I present
each participant with eight di¤erent choice sets and they must select their most preferred
option within each choice set. Within each choice scenario, respondents choose between
two alternatives. Respondents are processing the given information and selecting the option
that gives them the highest utility, consistent with how individuals make everyday decisions.
Since there is no status quo option in this survey, I cannot identify total WTP. I can, however,
estimate the WTP for an attribute change. I dene three attributes of each hypothetical
cleanup scenario of the MRB. The three attributes are "Percentage of Basin Cleaned," "Cost
of the Policy per Year," and "TimeWhen Cleanup is Fullled." Table 1 provides the attribute
denitions and levels.
In selecting the levels for the attributes, one must take into consideration what respon-
dents believe are credible values. "Percentage of Basin Cleaned" includes levels of fty, sixty,
and seventy percent.10 "Cost of the Policy per Year" includes levels of $100, $200, and $300.
This is the same range of costs selected by Viscusi et al. (2008).11 Finally, "Time When
Cleanup is Fullled" includes levels of zero, one, two, three, four, and ve years from now. I
utilize six levels of the time attribute to provide su¢ cient variation to identify discounting
parameters from the various discounting models.12
To facilitate valuation of the MRB, it is necessary to include cost as an attribute. I am
able to estimate the marginal WTP for river basin improvements by examining the tradeo¤
that respondents are willing to make between the amount of the basin that is cleaned and
the cost of the policy per year. Since costs are dened on a per-year basis, the marginal
WTP measure derived from this study is also interpreted as a per-year estimate. A reection
of a common occurrence in the real world, the survey explains that there may be situations
where water quality improvements do not occur until some time in the future even though
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taxes are raised immediately to pay for the policy. Respondents evaluate policies that would
temporarily improve the MRBs water quality in order to identify discounting parameters.
I provide some clarifying points within the attribute section of the survey. These clariers
are intended to minimize confounding factors in the survey design and establish a common
reference point for all respondents. To minimize uncertainty in the receipt of the future
reward, respondents are informed that future cleanups are just as certain as immediate
cleanups. This should mirror reality because a law setting a future pollution tolerance is just
as binding as a law setting an immediate pollution tolerance in the MRB. I state that the
current situation of the MRB should be considered zero percent cleaned and that this means
none of the surface waters meet the requirements to meet the Clean Water Act. This is a
close approximation to the real world situation and serves to establish a common reference
point.13 Finally, I explain the timing of the benets and costs of two sample alternatives. The
sample choice question from the survey is given in Table 2 and the subsequent explanation
text and tables as they appear in the survey are shown after the sample question. Individuals
indicated that they understood all of these nuances during pretests.14
Both of the unlabeled options can take on three levels of two attributes and six levels of
one attribute. Therefore, there are
 
3
2
   3
2
  6
2

= 135 possible choice sets, some of which
would have clearly dominated choices. Thus, it is more e¢ cient to estimate parameters from
a design of fewer choice sets. One popular measure of design e¢ ciency is D-error. I utilize
a priori parameter estimates from Viscusi, Bell, and Huber as inputs to the SAS choice¤
macro, which generates a choice design that minimizes D-error. 15
To assure su¢ cient intertemporal variation, I generate 32 choice sets. I divide the choice
sets into four di¤erent versions so that each respondent can avoid fatigue and only answer
eight choice questions. The online survey automatically rotated participants through the four
versions so that each choice question received the same number of responses.
The nal portion of the survey collects demographic information. While the sample is
not meant to be representative of the state of Minnesota, I observe variation in the answers to
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the demographic questions so that I am able to explore di¤erences in water quality valuation
for di¤erent subpopulations. This sample provides useful insights into the marginal tradeo¤s
that individuals are willing to make over time even though the WTP measures may di¤er
from the median Minnesota citizen. I also use the demographics to investigate di¤erences in
discount factors based upon observable characteristics. Summary demographic information
is presented in Table 5.
As previously noted, this study yielded 237 usable surveys. After dropping blank re-
sponses from some individuals that did not answer all questions, I was left with data for
1819 choice occasions.
4 Estimation Strategy and Results
4.1 Empirical Model
To analyze discrete choice data, I employ a random utility theoretic framework. This
framework explicitly accounts for the intertemporal nature of the choices.16 I assume that
intertemporal utility depends upon a deterministic portion and an error term that is unob-
servable to the researcher. Specically, the intertemporal utility for individual i and choice
j is given by
Uij =
TjX
t=0
 tvijt + ij; (1)
where ij =
PTj
t=0  itijt is the error for individual i associated with choice j, ijt is the
instantaneous error draw for individual i associated with choice j and time period t,  t
is the discount factor at time t, vijt is instantaneous utility, and Tj is the last year of
policy j. I assume that ijt  N(0; 2): Absent any modications, this in turn implies
that error draws are independent across observations for a given decision maker, which
is an unrealistic assumption given the panel nature of this data set. There are several
approaches that one could take to build in error correlation across the utilities of di¤erent
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alternatives for one individual. In Meyer (2012), I show a how various random coe¢ cients
specications can model this correlation. As discussed in Train (2003), random coe¢ cients
is formally equivalent to an error components model and both capture correlation of utilities
over alternatives. In the preferred specication from Meyer (2012), discount factors and
valuation parameters are treated as randomly varying across individuals.
I assume that vijt depends upon individual is income for time t, Yit; the level of river
basin cleanup in time period t, qijt, the cost of the cleanup for time t, cijt, and is random
draws for the coe¢ cients on q and c. For the rst specication, I have
Uij =
TjX
t=0
 it[iqijt + i(Yit   cijt)] + ij: (2)
Loosely following the exposition of Train (2003), i and i are xed for an individual across
choice occasions, but vary across individuals. Assume i is normally distributed in the
population with mean  and variance z2: Since one of the primary objectives of this research
is to estimate mean MWTP ( =), it is important to ensure that the mean of the WTP
distribution exists. As shown by Daly et al. (2012), no WTP moments exist when an
unbounded normal distribution is used for the distribution of the cost coe¢ cient. However,
mean WTP does exist for a triangular distribution that is bounded at 0. Thus, I assume
that i is distributed according to a triangular distribution with mean  and spread . By
constraining the mean and spread to be equal, I can assure that the  coe¢ cient has the same
sign for all individuals. This is a desirable property because we would not theoretically expect
any individuals to have positive price coe¢ cients and because it bounds the distribution at
0, ensuring the existence of mean WTP.
Furthermore, assume  i is xed for an individual but distributed normally in the pop-
ulation with mean  and variance z2 : Denote the choice situation as s and a sequence of
alternatives as j = fj1; :::; jSg: Then, conditional on , , and  , the probability that indi-
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vidual i makes a sequence of choices is the product over all s of the single choice probabilities:
Pij(; ;  ) =
SY
s=1
F
0@PTj;st=0  it[iqijts + i(Yits   cijts)] PTk;st=0  it[iqikts + i(Yits   cikts)]qPTk;s
t=0  
2
it +
PTj;s
t=0  
2
it
1A :
(3)
Denote the vector for individual i containing i, i, and  i as i. Since the  are random, I
integrate out over all values of  to get the unconditional choice probability
Pij =
Z
Pij()f()d: (4)
I draw R values of  and denote them r: The simulated choice probability is ePij =
1
R
RX
r=1
Pij(r): In this application, I set R = 200: Finally, I insert these simulated choice
probabilities into the log-likelihood function to get the simulated log likelihood (SLL)
SLL =
X
i
X
j
yij ln ePij; (5)
where yij = 1 if i chose sequence j and zero otherwise.
I estimate the means and standard deviations of all random parameters. One limitation
of assuming random parameters on the discount factor is that we do not see how personal
characteristics correlate with time preferences. To answer this question, I also include Spec-
ication II where the discount factor is a function of personal characteristics. Personal
characteristics that could potentially inuence discounting behavior include age, income,
sex, education level, and whether the respondent resides within the Minnesota River Basin.
In the case of the exponential discounting model,  = b0 + b1age + b2income + b3male +
b4education+ b5resident: I then modify equation 3 by substituting  for  i. To test whether
inclusion of demographics signicantly improves model t, I include a third specication
identical to Specication II except that all demographic variables are assumed to have coef-
cients equal to 0.
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Likewise, a limitation of assuming random coe¢ cients on the benet and cost variables is
that we do not see how ones marginal valuation changes with their personal characteristics.
Therefore, I estimate two additional specications where I still assume discounting parame-
ters are randomly distributed across the population and xed for one person. This ensures
that utilities from di¤erent choice scenarios are still correlated for a given decision maker.
One of the additional specications includes interactions of the cost and benet variables
with personal characteristics and the other assumes these personal interactions are equal to
0. Thus, for the fourth specication, I have
Uij =
TjX
t=0
 it[qijt + (Yit   cijt) + qijtxit + cijtxit] + ij; (6)
where xit is a vector of personal characteristics for individual i at time t.
4.2 Results
The format of the discount factors ( t) will depend on the type of discounting that is
assumed. Since I show in Meyer (2012) that the exponential discounting model is preferred
over hyperbolic discounting models for this data set, I take this as given. 17 Thus, I assume
that  it = 
t
i =
1
(1+ri)t
where  is the exponential discount factor and r is the exponential
discount rate. I focus here on deriving welfare implications and exploring the determinants
of heterogeneity in the discount factor and WTP.
Table 6 presents simulated maximum likelihood results for Specication I; all coe¢ cients
are highly signicant. The ratio of   bb gives an estimate of the annual WTP for a one
percent increase in the amount of river basin cleanup. Using the point estimates of the
mean values from Table 6, annual WTP for an additional one percent of river basin cleanup
is $8.86 with a 95 percent condence interval of ($5.97, $11.75).18
For Specication II, coe¢ cients on the means and standard deviations of improvement
and cost remain highly signicant. Resident is the only personal characteristic that is
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signicant at the conventional levels. Two other personal characteristics are close to being
signicantly related to the discount factor. Male has a positive estimated coe¢ cient with
a p-value of 0.105 and Education has a positive estimated coe¢ cient with a p-value of
0.118. Using the point estimates on Resident, Male, and Education, all else equal, MRB
residents have an estimated discount rate that is about 5.2 percentage points higher than
non-residents, males have an estimated discount rate that is about 3.9 percentage points
lower than females and the estimated discount rate decreases by about 1.1 percentage points
for each additional $15,000 in gross household income. Since Specication III is a restricted
version of Specication II, I utilize a likelihood ratio test. The null hypothesis of the test
is that the coe¢ cients of the personal characteristics are equal to zero; this corresponds to
Specication III. I reject the null hypothesis that the e¤ects of the personal characteristics
are jointly equal to zero (p-value = 0.06). Thus, there is evidence that MRB residents are
less patient than non-residents and weak evidence that males may be slightly more patient
than females and higher income individuals may be more patient for this population. 19
In Specication IV, Cost, Improvement, and the mean and standard deviation of the
discount factor remain signicant at the 0.01 level. Only two of the coe¢ cients on the
personal interaction variables are signicant at conventional levels. Both (Improvement
X Income)/10000 and (Improvement X Age)/1000 are signicant at the 0.1 level. All
else equal, individuals with higher incomes value basin water quality improvements more
than those with lower incomes, as is expected. Interestingly, older individuals have a lower
marginal utility of basin improvement. This could be due to older individuals being less
inclined to do the activities that would derive use benets from the basin or being less
inclined to support environmental programs. Three other variables are quite close to being
signicant at the 0.1 level. (Improvement X education) has a p-value of 0.112, (Cost X
income) has a p-value of 0.109, and (Cost X education) has a p-value of 0.106. The nearly
signicant interactions suggest that people with more education value basin improvements
less and higher income individuals are more sensitive to price.
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The coe¢ cients on these marginally signicant interaction variables do not agree with
intuition so I run three other specications as internal validity checks on the survey. In
Specication VI I only interact the level of basin improvement with personal characteristics
and in Specication VII I only interact the cost of the policy with personal characteristics.
Specication V restricts all of the coe¢ cients on personal interaction variables to be equal to
0 and is included for comparison purposes. Compared to Specication V, there is very little
improvement in the maximized value of the simulated log likelihood equation in Specication
VII. The improvement is a little better in Specication VI, but it is still a statistically
insignicant improvement. That is, interactions of personal characteristics with benet or
cost alone are insignicant as measured by a likelihood ratio test. However, the dubious
results from Specication IV on (Cost X income), (Cost X education), and (Improvement X
education) disappear in Specications VI and VII, which is good from an internal validity
standpoint.
To determine whether Specication IV or V is preferred, I utilize a likelihood ratio test.
The null hypothesis of the test is that the coe¢ cients of the personal interaction variables
are equal to zero; this corresponds to Specication V. I fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the personal interaction coe¢ cients are jointly equal to zero.20 As a result, I rely on
the results from Specication I for welfare analysis.
As the survey stated that cleanups would last for ve years, the total discounted MWTP
for an immediate river basin cleanup is equal to the present discounted value of all ve years
of benets. That is, PVMWTPimmediate = (1 + b + b2 + b3 + b4)    bb : With the mean
estimates from Specication I in Table 6, PVMWTPimmediate = $35:38 with a 95 percent
condence interval of ($23.60, $47.16).
Now suppose that it takes ve years for the river basin cleanup to occur. Then, the total
discounted MWTP for the delayed river basin cleanup is equal to the present discounted
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value of the delayed benets. That is,
PVMWTP5yrdelay = (b5 + b6 + b7 + b8 + b9)   bb

: (7)
Using the estimates from Table 6, PVMWTP5yrdelay = $19:45 with a 95 percent condence
interval of ($12.15, $26.75).
Comparing PVMWTPimmediate with PVMWTP5yrdelay, a delay of ve years in the time
that it takes to execute the river basin cleanup leads to a 45.03% loss in marginal WTP.
In other words, respondents would be willing to pay the same amount for a 54.97% total
cleanup of the Minnesota River Basin today as they would for a 100% total cleanup of the
MRB that is delayed by ve years.21
Lastly, I explore the sensitivity of the results for other discounting models. Here, I present
estimation results only for the full random parameters models without specifying discounting
parameters as a function of personal characteristics.22 Discount factors for Harveys (1986)
single-parameter hyperbolic structure are given by
 t;Harvey = (1 + t)
 : (8)
In the single-parameter model suggested by Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987) (HM),
discount factors are
 t;HM = (1 + !t)
 1: (9)
Finally, in the quasi-hyperbolic model23, the functional form of discount factors is given by
 t;Q H =
8><>: 1 if t = 0 andt if t > 0
9>=>; ; where 0 <  < 1; and  < 1: (10)
Table 8 shows the estimation results for three alternative discounting models. I assume the
Harvey parameter, ; is distributed normally. For the HM Hyperbolic parameter, !, and
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the Quasi-Hyperbolic parameters, I assume lognormal distributions as a practical necessita-
tion for convergence. Table 9 gives the means, medians, and standard deviations of these
parameters. As is shown in Meyer (2012), the exponential model is preferred to both of the
single parameter hyperbolic models and the quasi-hyperbolic model does not improve model
t enough to warrant its adoption over the exponential model.
Using the parameter estimates from Tables 8, I calculate point estimates of the mean
amount individuals would be willing to pay today for immediate and delayed MRB cleanups
for each of these alternative discounting specications. Table 10 shows the present values
of the average WTP for an immediate and a ve year delayed one percent increase in basin
cleanup for the alternative discounting models. One can see that the point estimates all fall
within the condence intervals from the exponential model.
From the point estimates of the present values of the MWTP for immediate and de-
layed cleanups, I calculate the estimated loss in marginal benets for each of the alternative
discounting models for comparison with the loss in marginal benets under exponential dis-
counting. The estimated lost marginal benets for a cleanup that is delayed by ve years is
41.7 percent for the Harvey Hyperbolic model, 38.4 percent for the HM Hyperbolic model,
and 46.4 percent for the quasi-hyperbolic model. Thus, no matter which discounting model
is t in this application, the loss in marginal benets is of similar magnitude.
Figure 2 plots discount factors for the four discounting models. In this gure, I use
parameter estimates that are consistent with those found in this study for all discounting
models. The HM discount factors track closely with exponential discount factors throughout
the relevant time frame. The Harvey discount factors are slightly lower than the exponential
discount factors until around year 9 when they cross. Also, the quasi-hyperbolic discount
factor is always slightly above the exponential discount factor but follows the same general
pattern. Therefore, it is not surprising that the MWTP condence intervals overlap with
these specic discounting parameters. In Figure 3 I use parameters that di¤er from the
results of this study but that are still within the range discussed in the literature. 24 In
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this case, the two single parameter hyperbolic discount factors diverge substantially from
the exponential discount factor. The large initial drop in the hyperbolic discount factors
graphed in Figure 3 captures the behavior of a present-biased individual. If individuals in
this study truly exhibited discount factors such as those shown in Figure 3 I would expect
those hyperbolic models to t better than the exponential model, which cannot capture such
present-biased behavior. In this case, I would also expect some divergence in the MWTP
condence intervals.
5 Conclusion
It often takes time to achieve environmental improvements, especially for nonpoint sources of
pollution. Previous work has too often neglected this issue when estimating the benets from
an environmental policy. As a result, there is potential for the estimates reported in a typical
study to overstate the true present value of benets. For example, an overestimate would
occur if respondents were not anticipating a delay in benets while the researcher modeled
a truly delayed outcome as though it were immediate. To address this issue, I include an
attribute for delay until an improvement is executed in the discrete choice experimental
design. I then simultaneously estimate discounting parameters and the coe¢ cients on the
amount of river basin improvement and annual cost of the improvement. This strategy
produces estimates for the present value of immediate and delayed river basin improvements
without having to separately impose a researcher specied discount rate.
Respondents of the Minnesota River Basin survey discount future basin water quality
improvements at an annual rate of thirteen percent. This is lower than many experimental
discounting studies but in line with results from many VSL studies. This implies that
Minnesota residents lose almost half of the marginal benets when improvements arrive ve
years from now instead of today. By recognizing the extent of the tradeo¤ between the level
of environmental improvement and the delay until the improvement occurs, policy makers
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can evaluate how much individuals will support competing programs. On the other hand,
policy makers that neglect information about this tradeo¤ could propose policies that will
receive low levels of public support.
A limitation of this research is that the sample is limited in size and may not be rep-
resentative of the population of Minnesota. Nevertheless, there is su¢ cient variation in
demographics to analyze heterogeneity in both time preferences and the marginal utility of
benets and costs. Furthermore, a rule of thumb from marketing research suggests that I
need approximately 1550 choices for the results to be reliable in terms of statistical power,
which is less than the 1819 choices present in this sample (Hensher et al., 2005).
For events in the distant future, economists are often not comfortable with the use of
exponential discounting because it places too low of a value on future environmental benets.
However, in this case, the hyperbolic models would lead us to weigh future marginal benets
no di¤erently than the exponential model. This should give some comfort to researchers
using exponential discount rates for cost benet analysis of projects with a ve or ten year
timeframe. Furthermore, exponential discounting is statistically supported for the respon-
dents of this survey, so it is appropriate to use constant discount rates to convert benets
into present values in this context anyhow.
Purely a descriptive study, I have not addressed the issue of how society as a whole
should discount the future. I assume that individuals care only about their own utility and
discount future benets based upon these intertemporal preferences. This is a reasonable
assumption for this study since the timeframe is relatively short and considerations for
future generations are not relevant. However, it would be an interesting extension to model
preferences in di¤erent manner for very long run issues such as climate change. A DCEwith
time as an attribute could potentially address these types of issues.
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Notes
1Meyer (2012) develops the estimation strategy and exclusively focuses on testing various
discounting models for 3 data sources: the Minnesota River Basin Survey, a stated preference
monetary survey, and state lottery winnerschoices between lump sum and annuity jackpots.
The key nding of that paper is that exponential discounting is preferred to hyperbolic
discounting when describing behavior for both the MRB study and lottery winners.
2See, for example, Weitzman (2001; 2010).
3This description of the MRB borrows heavily from the description developed by Nicholas
Flores for a di¤erent survey.
4I do not distinguish in the survey between waterbodies that are or are not protected for
drinking water because there are a relatively small number of segments protected for drinking
water in the MRB and a uniform criteria on all segments gives the percentage gure more
meaning.
5For more information on the Minnesota surface water regulations, see Minnesota Rules
Chapter 7050, available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/rules/?id=7050, and the explanation
of the rules provided by the MPCA (MPCA).
6The MPCA does note that reviewed waters reect e¤orts in past years to monitor and
assess more waters where problems were thought to exist in order to increase the likelihood
they would be worked on sooner. These percentages are therefore not necessarily reective of
total impaired water percentages basin wide. Minnesota has initiated an intensive watershed
monitoring design that is more systematic and unbiased.
7While I do not distinguish between use and nonuse values in the survey questions, I do
collect information about whether respondents reside within the MRB. As shown in the
results, being a resident of the study area has no signicant explanatory power over the MU
of improvement or cost. This suggests that use and nonuse values are similar in magnitude.
8I am not able to determine how many potential respondents saw the opportunity to
complete the survey and subsequently declined to participate. However, the survey opened
21
at 8:00 am on a Monday morning and had reached the quota of 250 respondents by Thursday
morning of that same week. Each SSI panelist was assigned a unique ID to prevent multiple
survey responses from the same person.
9Two individuals completed three choice scenarios, two completed four choice scenarios,
three completed ve scenarios, ten completed six scenarios, thirty completed seven scenarios,
and 190 completed all eight scenarios. Estimation results are not sensitive to the exclusion
of the individuals who completed three or four choice scenarios.
10There is an e¢ ciency gain in choosing attribute levels for quantitative factors that are
spread wider apart from one another. While a fty percent improvement is large for a rel-
atively short timeframe, focus groups indicated that improvements close to 0 percent were
viewed quite di¤erently than improvements of more than fty percent. Similarly, improve-
ments of 100 percent were potentially viewed di¤erently than improvements of 50 percent.
As I planned to model utility as linear in percentage of basin improvements, I wanted to
avoid introducing potential nonlinearlities in this attribute due to including levels below 50
percent or too close to 100 percent. Since the discount rate is being identied from tradeo¤s
in the extent of the basin improvement, it is critical to stay within a linear improvement
range.
11Further ameliorating concern over sensitivities to the cost levels chosen, Hanley, Adamow-
icz, and Wright (2005) nd no signicant di¤erence in estimates of preferences or willingness-
to-pay when changing the price levels.
12There is a tradeo¤ here between selecting cleanup timeframes that are plausible to the
respondents and getting enough intertemporal variation to identify the parameters of various
discounting specications. I am working under the assumption that respondents can abstract
from the reality of time lags and imagine that the MRB were "magically" cleaned to the
specied level with no or little delay when indicated by the choice scenario.
13Recall that a preliminary measure from the MPCA suggests that approximately ten
percent of the basin is currently supporting all assessed uses. Anecdotal evidence from
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scientists at the time of survey administration supported the approximation of zero percent
meeting requirements of the Clean Water Act.
14One concern related to using a forced choice survey design is that total WTP values
can be biased upwards because some individuals that would vote noto all alternatives are
still forced to choose one of the alternative improvement policies, even if it would lead to a
net loss in utility. However, if an opt-out alternative is not presented, the choice provides
information on preferences, conditional on choosing one of the alternatives, but it does not
provide information on whether the individual would choose one of the alternatives or not
(Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003). Viscusi et al. utilize a forced choice design in a similar
context and nd that "water quality-cost tradeo¤s were similar to those using a referendum
format and an iterative paired comparison format" (2008). This coupled with concerns
about having su¢ cient statistical power to facilitate testing between competing discounting
hypothesis with a reduced sample size led to the decision to omit an opt-outalternative.
Therefore, I only estimate marginal WTP for this study.
15D-e¢ ciency sacrices some design orthogonality through using prior information about
parameters to ultimately result in data that generates smaller standard errors on parameter
estimates.
16For further details of the development of the model, see Meyer (2012).
17The exponential model is preferred to the quasi-hyperbolic model on the basis of a
likelihood ratio test and is preferred to the single parameter hyperbolic models on the basis
of non-nested model selection tests such as the AIC.
18The condence intervals in this section are constructed using the delta method.
19The test statistic is equal to twice the di¤erence in the maximized values of the simulated
log likelihoods corresponding to the two specications and is distributed chi-squared with 5
degrees of freedom. From Table 6, the test statistic is equal to 10.57.
20The test statistic is equal to twice the di¤erence in the maximized values of the simulated
log likelihoods corresponding to the two specications and is distributed chi-squared with
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ten degrees of freedom. From Table 6, the test statistic is equal to 13.121.
21This assumes a constant marginal utility of basin improvement over the relevant range
of cleanup possibilities.
22For each of the alternative discounting models, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that
coe¢ cients on the personal characteristics are equal to zero. These results are available upon
request.
23The quasi-hyperbolic functional form was rst introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968).
Laibson (1997) applied the functional form to consumption and savings decisions.
24See, for example, Keller and Strazzera (2002); Viscusi et al. (2008); Cairns and van der
pol (2000).
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[Figure 1: The Minnesota River Basin]
[Figure 2: Comparison of Discount Factors I: Exponential (t) with  = :887,
Harvey Hyperbolic ((1 + t) ) with  = :459, Quasi-hyperbolic (1; t) with  =
1:099,  = :879, and HM Hyperbolic ((1 + !t) 1) with ! = :156.]
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[Figure 3: Comparison of Discount Factors II: Comparison of Discount Factors
II: Exponential (t) with  = :885, Harvey Hyperbolic ((1 + t) ) with  = :6,
Quasi-hyperbolic (1; t) with  = :7,  = :92, and HM Hyperbolic ((1 + !t) 1)
with ! = :4.]
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Table 1: Survey Attributes
Attribute Denition Levels
Percentage of Basin Cleaned The percentage of the Minnesota
River Basins surface waters having
water quality high enough after the
cleanup is fullled to: 1) maintain
healthy, diverse, and successfully
reproducing populations of aquatic
organisms, including invertebrates
such as sh, AND, 2) be suitable for
swimming and other forms of water
recreation.
50%, 60%, 70%
Cost of the Policy Per Year The amount of money that a
household would have to contribute
per year in the form of increased
state income taxes. For each policy,
a household would make ve yearly
payments of increased taxes,
beginning immediately this year.
$100, $200, $300
Time When Cleanup is Fullled The number of years until the
cleanup is fullled to the level of the
policy. The water quality
improvement ends ve years after
the cleanup is fullled.
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
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Table 2: (EXAMPLE I) Here is an example of the questions that you will answer. Two
policies are presented. For each question, you will select the policy that you prefer. Following
the table are descriptions of "Policy A" and "Policy B."
Characteristic Policy A Policy B
Percentage of Basin Cleaned 50% 70%
Cost of Policy Per Year $100 $200
Time When Cleanup is Fullled Now (2008) 2 Years From Now (2010)
Check the box of the policy you prefer
I prefer Policy A I prefer Policy B
Policy Aresults in 50% of the Minnesota River Basins surface waters being cleaned
up immediately. The improvement lasts for 5 years. The cost of Policy A is $100 per
year and begins immediately. Your household would have to make ve yearly increased tax
payments.
Table 3: (EXAMPLE I) Summary of Benets and Costs for "Policy A"
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Percentage of Basin Cleaned 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Payment $100 $100 $100 $100 $100 $0 $0 $0 $0
Policy Bresults in 70% of the Minnesota River Basins surface waters being cleaned
up beginning 2 years from today. The improvement lasts for 5 years after the cleanup is
fullled. The cost of Policy Bis $200 per year and begins immediately. Your household
would have to make ve yearly increased tax payments.
Table 4: (EXAMPLE I) Summary of Benets and Costs for "Policy B"
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Percentage of Basin Cleaned 0% 0% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 0% 0%
Payment $200 $200 $200 $200 $200 $0 $0 $0 $0
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Table 5: Demographics for the Minnesota River Basin Survey and the State of Minnesota
Characteristic MRB Survey
Sample
Minnesota
Population
Median Age 51.0 36.9
(Standard Deviation) 15.16
Percent Male 21.1 49.8
(Standard Deviation) 40.89
Median Household Income $ 42,500 $ 55,616
(Standard Deviation) $ 34,324
Percent High School Degree or Higher 98.3 90.7
(Standard Deviation) 12.93
Percent Bachelors Degree or Higher 34.2 30.6
(Standard Deviation) 47.44
Percent White 92.4 88.0
(Standard Deviation) 26.50
Percent Black or African American 1.3 4.3
(Standard Deviation) 11.33
Percent American Indian or Alaska Native 2.1 1.0
(Standard Deviation) 14.34
Percent Asian 2.1 3.4
(Standard Deviation) 14.34
31
Table 6: Simulated Maximum Likelihood Results for Specications I, II, and III
I. II. III.
Variable / Parameter
Mean Improvement*10 0.440  0.280  0.287 
(0.0495) (0.0397) (0.0399)
S.D. Improvement 0.0499  0.0385  0.0372 
(0.00592) (0.00433) (0.0043)
Mean Cost*10 -0.0497  -0.0383  -0.0381 
(0.00396) (0.00297) (0.00297)
S.D. Cost*10 0.0497  0.0383  0.0381 
(0.00396) (0.00297) (0.00297)
Mean = -8.862  -7.314  -7.527 
(1.476) (0.965) (0.959)
Exponential () Mean 0.887  0.889 
(0.0103) (0.00986)
Exponential () S.D. 0.088 
(0.0104)
Personal Characteristics
Intercept 0.872 
(0.0345)
Age -0.00376
(0.00521)
Income -0.00079
(0.00241)
Male 0.03068
(0.019)
Education 0.00873
(0.00558)
MRB Resident -0.03797 
(0.0197)
Mean (^) = d1=(1 + r) 0.880
Median (^) = d1=(1 + r) 0.880
Simulated Log L -1032.89 -1072.61 -1077.9
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parenthesis.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for mean  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
Standard Errors of = calculated with the delta method
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Table 7: Simulated Maximum Likelihood Results for Specications IV, V, VI, and VII
IV V VI VII
Variable / Parameter
Basin Improvement 0.0526  0.0336  0.0476  0.0334 
(0.01156) (0.00273) (0.00835) (0.00273)
Cost -0.00466  -0.00386  -0.00383  -0.00316 
(0.00126) (0.00027) (0.00027) (0.0009)
Improvement X Age/1000 -0.299  -0.298 
(0.173) (0.126)
Improvement X Income/10000 0.00170  0.00071
(0.00091) (0.00058)
Improvement X Male -0.0802 -0.0291
(0.0625) (0.0467)
Improvement X Resident 0.0390 0.0148
(0.0512) (0.0366)
Improvement X Education -0.0272 -0.00724
(0.0171) (0.0119)
(Cost X Age/1000) 0.0122 -0.211
(0.181) (0.131)
Cost X Income/10000 -0.00015 -0.00003
(0.00009) (0.00006)
Cost X Male 0.00749 0.00161
(0.00636) (0.00483)
Cost X Resident -0.00358 -0.00122
(0.00544) (0.00391)
Cost X Education/100 0.0304 0.0108
(0.0188) (0.0134)
() Mean 0.897  0.900  0.898  0.898 
(0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0114)
() S.D. 0.108  0.109  0.109  0.109 
(0.0137) (0.0134) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Simulated Log L -1104.28 -1110.84 -1107.66 -1110.46
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parenthesis.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
The t-tests for mean  are against 1. All others are tested against 0.
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Table 8: Estimation Results for Alternative Discounting Models
Harvey
Hyperbolic
HM
Hyperbolic
Quasi-
Hyperbolic
Variable / Parameter
Mean Basin Improvement*10 0.450  0.491  0.444 
(0.05) (0.0551) (0.0526)
S.D. Basin Improvement 0.0507  0.0559  0.0496 
(0.00588) (0.00635) (0.00595)
Mean Cost*10 -0.0485  -0.0502  -0.0501 
(0.00373) (0.00387) (0.00416)
S.D. Cost*10 0.0485  0.0502  0.0501 
(0.00373) (0.00387) (0.00416)
Mean = -9.279  -9.775  -8.849 
(0.94) (0.992) (0.994)
Harvey () Parameter Mean 0.459 
(0.0408)
Harvey () Parameter S.D. 0.350 
(0.0415)
Mean of ln(!) -1.858 
(0.165)
S.D. of ln(!) 1.609 
(0.208)
Mean of ln () 0.0947
(0.106)
S.D. of ln () 0.288
(0.194)
Mean of ln() -0.129 
(0.0131)
S.D. of ln() 0.0889 
(0.0108)
Simulated Log L -1052.36 -1043.83 -1031.96
Note: Asymptotic Standard Errors are given in parenthesis.
* signicant at 10%, **signicant at 5%, *** signicant at 1%
Standard Errors of = calculated with the delta method
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Table 9: Point Estimates of Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of (!) and () and ()
Parameters from Table 8
Median Mean Std. Dev.
Parameter
HM (!) 0.156 0.3488 0.6975
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 1.099 1.270 0.7334
Quasi-Hyperbolic () 0.879 0.919 0.2801
Table 10: MWTP for Immediate and 5 Year Delayed Cleanups for Alternative Discounting
Models
Harvey HM Q-H
MWTP Immediate Cleanup $30.97 $38.36 $37.30
MWTP Cleanup Delayed 5 Years $18.05 $23.62 $19.98
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